



**GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN
MINISTRY OF MARITIME AFFAIRS
(PORTS & SHIPPING WING)**

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No.3(1)/2025-CNS/INQUIRY/INQUIRY/SIBI/01/2026

Dated: 06th August 2026

MARINE CASUALTY INQUIRY REPORT /M.V. SIBI

Subject: Container Stack Collapse and Cargo Damage onboard M.V. SIBI (IMO No. 9519224) on 15 June 2026.

1. INVESTIGATION AUTHORITY AND LEGAL BASIS

1.1 This Inquiry into the marine casualty involving the Pakistani flagged vessel M.V. SIBI (IMO No. 9519224) was initiated by the Directorate General Ports & Shipping Wing Karachi in accordance with **Sections 470 and 471 of the Merchant Shipping Ordinance, 2001.**

1.2 The occurrence is being treated as a **Marine Casualty** for investigation purposes, in line with the **IMO Casualty Investigation Code (Resolution MSC.255(84))** and relevant provisions of **SOLAS Chapter XI-1.**

1.3 The investigation aims :

To ascertain the facts and circumstances surrounding the casualty.

To determine the causal factors contributing to the incident.

To identify any breaches of regulations or the company's Safety Management System (SMS).

To formulate safety recommendations to prevent recurrence.

2. INVESTIGATION TEAM

Name & Designation	Organization / Department	Role
Capt. Rafaqat Hussain	Directorate General Ports & Shipping	Lead Investigator (Chief Nautical Surveyor)
Capt. Syed Ali Raza	Directorate General Ports & Shipping	Investigation Officer (Deputy Chief Nautical Surveyor)

3. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

3.1 On 15 June 2026 at approximately 0330 hrs LT. (UTC+5), while on passage from Khorfakkan, UAE, to Karachi, Pakistan, the M.V. SIBI experienced a catastrophic collapse of container stacks in Holds No. 1 and No. 5. The incident occurred in the North Arabian Sea during the seasonal southwest monsoon, where the vessel encountered rough to very rough seas with wind gusting up to 30 knots.

3.2 The collapse resulted in significant cargo damage, including the collapse of container rows against the ship's side. Approximately 50 cm of water was also found in Hold No. 2, which was promptly pumped out. No loss of life, personal injury, pollution, or loss of seaworthiness was reported, and the vessel remained under command throughout.

3.3 The investigation identified multiple root causes, including inadequate passage planning, failure to act upon weather forecasts, the acceptance of substandard containers, excessive stack weights due to high-density cargo (steel scrap), and the inherent design limitations of a converted bulk carrier for container stowage.

3.4 The investigation concludes that the incident was primarily caused by systemic failures in the company's Safety Management System (SMS) implementation, specifically related to passage planning, weather monitoring, and cargo acceptance. The vessel's staff responded commendably to the emergency however the passage planning and acceptance of Substandard containers was direct responsibility of Ship Staff.

4. VESSEL PARTICULARS

Particular	Detail
Name of Vessel	M.V. SIBI
IMO Number	9519224
Call Sign	AQQH
Flag / Port of Registry	Pakistani / KARACHI
Type of Ship	Bulk Carrier (Modified to carry containers in holds and on hatch covers)
Year of Built	2009
Class	CCS
Length Overall (LOA)	169.37 M

Particular	Detail
Breadth (Moulded)	27.20 M
Summer Deadweight	28,442 MT
Summer Draft	9.819 M
GRT / NRT	17,018 / 10,109
Main Engine	B&W 6S42MC
Owner	SIBI SHIPPING PVT LTD
Manager/Operator	Pakistan National Shipping Corporation (PNSC)

5. BACKGROUND AND NARRATIVE

5.1 M.V. SIBI is a 2009-built bulk carrier that has been converted to carry containers in its cargo holds and on hatch covers. On 13 June 2026, the vessel sailed from Khorfakkan, UAE, at 2230 LT (UTC+ 4 Hrs), bound for Karachi, Pakistan, with a cargo of containers.

5.2 The vessel's maximum draft at the time was approximately 6.70 meters, allowing the option of a coastal route along the Makran coast to avoid the worst of the southwest monsoon conditions.

6. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS (CHRONOLOGY)

6.1 On 13 June 2026 at 2230 LT /(UTC+4): M.V. SIBI sailed from Khorfakkan, UAE, bound for Karachi, Pakistan, with a cargo of containers.

6.2 On14 June 2026: The Master issued Night Orders. The first set made no mention of the adverse weather the vessel was expected to encounter. A second set, also dated 15 June, made a generic reference to "bad weather" and "rough sea" but lacked critical details such as the time of issuance and time of the officers' signatures, as IMO guidelines.

6.3 On 15 June 2026 @ 0330 LT (UTC+5): While the vessel was on a reduced speed and Altered Course to mitigate heavy rolling, a sudden, loud rumbling noise was heard coming from the cargo hold #.5 . The vessel's position was approximately in the North Arabian Sea, approximately 44 nm SSE of Gwadar port experiencing seasonal southwest monsoon weather.

6.4 On15 June 2026 @ 0400 LT (UTC+5): A physical investigation by the Chief Officer, Captain and crew confirmed that the lower tier of containers in Hold No. 5 had collapsed, causing the entire row to Collapse towards the ship's side in North Arabia Sea.

6.5 On 15 June 2026 @ 0600 LT (UTC+5) : After daylight, a further inspection revealed that the lower tier of containers in Hold No. 1 had also collapsed . Additionally, approximately 50 cm of water was found on the tank top of Hold No. 2, likely due to heavy motion of vessel and Shipping seas on deck.

6.6 15 June 2026: The water in Hold No. 2 was pumped out. The Master immediately informed the company (PNSC), and subsequently issued a Note of Protest to protect the Owner's, Operators of the vessel as per law.

6.7 On16 June 2026: The vessel safely arrived at Karachi as scheduled.

7. EVIDENCE COLLECTED AND DOCUMENTS EXAMINED

7.1 The Investigation Team reviewed the following documents and evidence:

Annex	Evidence	Status
A	Master's Incident Investigation Report (HSE-006)	Submitted
B	PNSC Initial Investigation Report	Submitted
C	Master's Statement	Submitted
D	Chief Officer's Statement	Submitted
E	Ship's Particulars	Submitted
F	ECDIS Track / Position Records	Submitted (Manually annotated – not authenticated electronic playback)
G	Passage Plan (Khorfakkan to Karachi)	Submitted
H	Night Orders (14 & 15 June 2026)	Submitted
I	Weather Reports (Pakistan Meteorological Department)	Submitted
J	Deck Log Book	Submitted
K	Engine Log Book	Submitted
L	Container Bay Plan & Container Details (Voyage 005)	Submitted

Annex	Evidence	Status
M	Lashing Completion Certificate	Submitted (Initial container inspection document)
N	Photographic Evidence	Submitted

7.2 Note on ECDIS Evidence: The ECDIS document submitted during the investigation consists of manually annotated track information and does not represent an authenticated electronic replay or original ECDIS playback. The submitted document therefore cannot be considered as primary navigational evidence for reconstruction of the vessel's movements. The Investigation Team recommends that future investigations obtain:

Original ECDIS playback files.
ECDIS log files and route monitoring records.
Time-stamped screenshots.
GPS position history.
VDR/S-VDR recordings, where fitted.

8. WEATHER ANALYSIS

8.1 Forecast Conditions: The Passage Plan was prepared routinely, indicating expected conditions of Beaufort Scale 3/4 with very low swell and slight seas. This was a generic plan, seemingly copied for all weather conditions and seasons, with no special consideration for the southwest monsoon.

8.2 Actual Conditions: The actual weather reports from the Pakistan Meteorological Department for 15-16 June 2026 for the North Arabian Sea and the Gulf of Oman, where the vessel was transiting, were significantly worse:

Wind: SW/W 12-17 knots, gusting up to 27-30 knots.
Sea State: Slight to Moderate, occasionally Rough to Very Rough.
Visibility: 2-4 NM, reducing to 1 NM in rain.

8.3 Vessel Motions: Deck Log Book entries confirm the vessel was "rolling heavily at all times" and that the course was "continuously adjusted to avoid excessive rolling." The combination of wind, sea state, and swell generated extreme vertical and transverse accelerations, which contributed to the dynamic loads on the container stacks.

9. ECDIS ANALYSIS

9.1 The submitted ECDIS track shows the vessel's route from Khorfakkan to Karachi, indicating that the vessel was positioned more than 40 nautical miles off the Makran coast.

9.2 Given the vessel's shallow draft (6.70 meters), the vessel could have taken a more sheltered coastal route to minimize the effects of the southwest monsoon. The chosen route did not demonstrate any heavy weather avoidance strategy.

10. STABILITY AND CARGO SECURING ANALYSIS

10.1 Cargo Securing Manual: The vessel is a converted bulk carrier to non-Cellular type container ship and relies on "shoe sockets" on the tank top and lashings for container securing.

10.2 Container Condition: The containers were noted in Bad condition, with some containers found dented, badly rusted. The lower-tier containers were particularly vulnerable and could not withstand the top loads of 4-high and 5-high stacks.

10.3 Cargo Weight and Density: The containers were loaded with steel scrap (cans, metals), a high-density cargo. The Bay Plan indicates many containers had gross weights exceeding 24 MT, with some reaching up to 30.6 MT. These excessive weights placed significant static and dynamic loads on the lower-tier containers, leading to their collapse.

10.4 Vessel Design Limitations: The shape of Holds No. 1 and No. 5 is Narrow at Ends or ship-shaped, with large void spaces at the ship sides and ends. This design allows containers to fall to the side more easily when lashings give way. Midship holds (No. 2, 3, 4) with their box shape remained intact, confirming the design deficiency of the end holds.

11. HUMAN FACTORS

11.1 Master's Decisions: The Master demonstrated commendable seamanship by reducing speed and adjusting course to minimize rolling after the incident. However, the pre-incident planning did not adequately account for the forecasted severe weather.

11.2 Officer of the Watch: The Night Orders did not provide clear guidance on heavy weather procedures, weather monitoring, or cargo inspection during the watch.

11.3 Bridge Resource Management: The lack of detailed weather-related instructions in the Night Orders and the generic nature of the passage plan suggest a breakdown in the planning and risk assessment process.

11.4 Situational Awareness: The vessel's staff had access to weather forecasts indicating severe conditions but did not take proactive measures to avoid the worst of the weather before the incident occurred.

12. ISM CODE COMPLIANCE REVIEW

12.1 The investigation assessed compliance with the ISM Code, specifically:

ISM Code Section	Requirement	Finding
Section 7	Shipboard operations and procedures	Non-Compliant: Heavy weather procedures were not effectively implemented.
Section 8	Emergency preparedness	Compliant: The ship's staff responded effectively to the emergency.
Section 10	Maintenance of the ship and equipment	Non-Compliant: Substandard containers were accepted for loading.
Section 11	Documentation	Non-Compliant: Night Orders lacked required details (time, signatures).

12.2 Specific SMS Failures:

Passage Planning: The passage plan was generic and did not account for seasonal weather.

Weather Monitoring: There was no evidence of proactive weather routing or a "go/no-go" decision-making process.

Cargo Acceptance: Containers in poor condition were loaded, **Documentation:** Night Orders and other critical documents were incomplete.

13.FLAG STATE INSPECTION

13.1 Following the incident, the Flag State requested an inspection of M.V. SIBI, which was arranged on 24 June 2026.

13.2 The inspection was conducted by:

Chief Nautical Surveyor Capt. Rafaqat Hussain (Lead Investigator).

Deputy Chief Nautical Surveyor Capt. Syed Ali Raza (Investigation Officer).

13.3 The following inspections and interviews were carried out:

Compartments Inspected: Holds No. 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5, with particular attention to the collapsed container stacks, tank top condition, and any structural damage.

Hatch Covers and Lashings: Inspected for damage and adequacy.

Hull Condition: Visual inspection of side shell plating and hopper tanks for potential impact damage.

Interviews Conducted: Master, Chief Officer, and Chief Engineer provided statements.

Photographs Taken: Comprehensive photographic evidence of container damage, stack collapse, and water ingress was collected.

Damage Measurements: Noted the extent of container damage and collapse patterns.

Cargo Condition: Observed the poor condition of damaged containers and the high-density nature of the cargo.

13.4 The Flag State inspection confirmed the findings of the initial vessel investigation and provided additional evidence of the root causes.

14 ANALYSIS

14.1 Immediate Causes

14.1.1 The immediate cause of the incident was the **structural failure of the lower-tier containers** in Holds No. 1 and No. 5.

14.1.2 This failure was triggered by extreme dynamic forces generated by the vessel's heavy rolling and pitching in the prevailing heavy weather conditions (Rough to Very Rough seas).

14.1.3 The cause of bottom tier failure lead to collapse of above tiers

14.2 Root Causes

14.2.1 Inadequate Passage Planning: The passage plan was a generic document that did not account for the seasonal southwest monsoon conditions. There was no consideration for altering the route to a more sheltered coastal route, despite the vessel's shallow draft (6.70 meters), which would have allowed it.

14.2.2 Failure to Monitor and Act on Weather Forecasts: The vessel failed to act upon the actual weather forecasts, which predicted conditions far more severe than those in the passage plan. There was no evidence of proactive measures, such as a significant reduction in speed or a major course alteration well before the weather deteriorated.

14.2.3 Acceptance of Substandard Containers: The investigation revealed that the lower-tier containers were in poor condition and showed signs of ageing, rust, and bulging. They were unable to withstand the top loads of 4-high and 5-high stacks and the dynamic forces of the vessel's motions.

14.2.4 High-Density Cargo: The containers were loaded with steel scrap (cans, metals), a high-density cargo. This significantly increased the weight of the stacks, placing excessive static and dynamic loads on the lower-tier containers.

14.2.5 Vessel Conversion and Design Limitations: The vessel, a converted bulk carrier, was not optimally designed for carrying containers. The lack of cell guides and the "ship-shaped" nature of the forward and aft holds (No. 1 and No. 5) made the container stacks more vulnerable to collapse and shifting during heavy rolling. The midship holds (No. 2,

3, 4) with their box shape remained intact, confirming the design deficiency of the end holds.

14.2.6 Deficient Safety Management System (SMS) Implementation: The failures in passage planning, weather monitoring, and cargo acceptance indicate that the company's SMS was not being effectively implemented on board. The "copy-paste" passage plan is a clear indicator of a systemic failure in the planning process.

14.2.7 Misrepresentation of Vessel Speed and Engine Maneuvers: A significant discrepancy was found between the Engine Log Book and the GPS Log. The Engine Log Book recorded the engine as being at "Dead Slow Ahead" at 0405 hrs, implying a speed of approximately 4-5 knots. However, the GPS Log for the same period shows the vessel's speed consistently remained around 8.8 to 8.9 knots, with a speed of 10.1 knots at 0001 hrs and 8.9 knots at 0200, 0300, 0500, and 0600 hrs on 15 June 2026. This indicates that the speed reduction was minimal (only 1.2 knots from midnight) and was due to the prevailing sea conditions rather than a significant reduction in engine RPM. The Engine Log Book entry appears to be a manipulation of records to portray a more significant reduction in speed than what was actually achieved, undermining the credibility of the claim that the vessel proceeded at a "safe speed."

15.CONCLUSIONS

15.1 The marine casualty onboard M.V. SIBI on 15 June 2026 was a direct result of the collapse of container stacks in Holds No. 1 and No. 5.

15.2 The collapse was caused by a combination of factors:

Severe and forecasted southwest monsoon weather.

Inadequate passage planning and failure to implement heavy weather avoidance measures.

Poor condition of the lower-tier containers.

High-density cargo (steel scrap) loaded on top tiers.

The inherent design limitations of a converted bulk carrier for container stowage.

Misrepresentation of the vessel's actual speed in the Engine Log Book, which failed to reflect the true operational measures taken.

15.3 While the ship's staff acted commendably in their immediate response to the emergency, there were significant systemic failures in planning and risk assessment that contributed to the incident.

15.4 The investigation finds that the vessel was in non-compliance with the company's SMS, specifically regarding passage planning, weather monitoring, and cargo acceptance.

16.SAFETY RECOMMENDATIONS

16.1 For the Company (PNSC / SIBI Shipping Pvt Ltd)

16.1.1 Issue a Non-Conformity to the Vessel: PNSC shall issue a formal non-conformity to M.V. SIBI for failure to comply with the company's SMS requirements for:

Passage planning (not voyage-specific, not considering seasonal weather).

Weather monitoring (failure to act on forecasted adverse conditions).

Cargo acceptance (loading substandard containers).

Documentation (incomplete Night Orders).

16.1.2 Implement Passage Planning Procedures: Ensure all passage plans are voyage-specific and incorporate a thorough risk assessment for the expected seasonal weather conditions. Plans must include provisions for early heavy weather avoidance, such as alternative routes and a "Go/No-Go" areas decision-making process.

16.1.3 Strengthen Weather Monitoring: Mandate a strict procedure for continuously monitoring and acting upon weather forecasts (e.g., from meteorological offices, commercial routing services). Masters must be required to document all weather-related decisions and actions.

16.1.4 Enhance Cargo Acceptance Criteria: Implement and enforce a strict policy for accepting containers, including a mandatory inspection of containers before loading. Containers showing signs of damage, bulging, or poor structural condition and no container marking must be rejected. The "Last Inspection Report for Containers Loading on Board" was submitted by the vessel, but the inspection criteria were clearly inadequate.

16.1.5 Review Cargo Stowage and Securing: Conduct a comprehensive review of the vessel's container stowage and securing manual, specifically for converted bulk carriers. Consider restricting the maximum stack height and total weight in the vulnerable end holds (No. 1 and No. 5).

16.1.6 Revise the SMS: Update the company's Safety Management System to address the specific risks of operating converted bulk carriers as container ships, especially during monsoon seasons. This should include specific guidance on passage planning, weather routing, and cargo acceptance.

16.1.7 Conduct Refresher Training: Provide mandatory refresher training for all Masters and Chief Officers and Navigating officer on:

Passage planning and the use of weather report at appraisal and planning state.

Heavy weather cargo monitoring and emergency response procedures.

Container inspection and acceptance criteria.

The importance of accurate and timely documentation (e.g., Night Orders, Log Books).

16.1.8 Review and Verify Log Book Entries: Instruct all vessels to ensure that Engine Log Book entries accurately reflect the actual engine RPM and vessel speed. Implement a procedure for cross-verification of speed records with GPS data to prevent manipulation of records.

16.2 For the Flag State (DGPS):

16.2.1 Issue Industry Guidance: Issue a Marine Notice or circular to all Pakistani flag vessels, particularly converted vessels, highlighting the risks associated with carrying containers during monsoon seasons and emphasizing the importance of robust passage planning and cargo acceptance procedures.

16.2.2 Require Authenticated ECDIS Records: For future casualty investigations, require the submission of original ECDIS playback files, log files, and route monitoring records as primary navigational evidence.

ANNEXES

Annex A: Master's Incident Investigation Report (HSE-006)

Annex B: PNSC Initial Investigation Report

Annex C: Master's Statement

Annex D: Chief Officer's Statement

Annex E: Ship's Particulars

Annex F: ECDIS Track / Position Records

Annex G: Passage Plan (Khorfakkan to Karachi)

Annex H: Master Night Orders (14 June 2026)

Annex I: Weather Reports (Pakistan Meteorological Department)

Annex J: Log Books

Annex K: Engine Log Book

Annex L: Container Bay Plan & Container Details (Voyage 005)

Annex M: Lashing Completion Certificate

Annex N: Photographic Evidence

Investigation lead by:

Capt. Rafaqat Hussain

Chief Nautical Surveyor

Directorate General Ports & Shipping

Investigation Officer:

Capt. Syed Ali Raza

Deputy Chief Nautical Surveyor

Directorate General Ports & Shipping

Date: 23 July 2026

11-Jan-2025 Loade

This report is submitted with the approval of the Competent Authority.

Prepared by
Capt. Razaqat Hussain

A handwritten signature in blue ink, consisting of a large, stylized 'R' followed by a series of vertical strokes.

Chief Nautical Surveyor
Directorate General Ports & Shipping

Assisted by

1. Deputy Chief Nautical Surveyor, Capt. Syed Ali Raza,
2. Nautical Survey (Exams) Capt. Arif Javed